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Abstract: What is the relationship between economic growth and its 
volatility? Does political instability affect growth directly or indirectly, 
through volatility? This paper tries to answer such questions using a 
power-ARCH framework with annual time series data for Argentina from 
1896 to 2000. We show that while assassinations and strikes (what we call 
“informal” political instability) have a direct negative effect on economic 
growth, “formal” political instability (constitutional and legislative 
changes) has an indirect (through volatility) negative impact. We also find 
preliminary support for the idea that while the effects of “formal” 
instability are stronger in the long-run, those of “informal” instability are 
stronger in the short-run. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What is the relationship between economic growth and its volatility? How does political 
instability affect growth? This paper tries to answer such questions using a power-ARCH 
(PARCH) framework and annual time series data for Argentina covering the period from 
1896 to 2000. 
The paper tries to make three contributions. One is to bridge the literature on the 
macroeconomics of political instability (based on cross-sectional and short-panels evidence) 
with that on the relationship between growth and volatility (time-series based).1 A second is 
to try to shed light on two puzzles. One is on the sign of the relationship between volatility 
and growth: Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that output growth rates are adversely affected 
by their volatility, while Grier and Tullock (1989) find that higher standard deviations of 
growth are associated with higher mean rates. The second puzzle regards the duration of 
the political instability effects: while the conventional wisdom is that these are severe in the 
long-run, Campos and Nugent (2002) and Murdoch and Sandler (2004) argue that they are 
significantly stronger in the short- than in the long-run. The third intended contribution is 
to put forward novel econometric evidence on the Argentine puzzle: “Argentina’s ratio to 
OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, 65 percent in 1973, and a mere 43 percent in 1987 
(…) Argentina is therefore unique” (della Paolera and Taylor, 2003, p. 5, italics added). 
Argentina is the only country that was classified as developed in 1900, and as developing in 
2000. Although a large literature associates this decline to political factors,2 we are unaware 
of studies that do it econometrically.  
                                                 
1 Durlauf et al. (2005) survey the former, and Grier et al. (2004) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007) review the 
latter. One paper that tries to link these literatures and is close to ours in this sense is Asteriou and Price 
(2001), which has time series evidence from UK quarterly data after 1960. 
2 Acemoglu and Robinson observe that: “The political history of Argentina (…) reveals an extraordinary pattern 
where democracy was created in 1912, undermined in 1930, re-created in 1946, undermined in 1955, fully re-
created in 1973, undermined in 1976, and finally reestablished in 1983” (2006, p. 7). See also della Paolera and 
Taylor (2003) and references therein.   2
 
2. Model  
 
The PARCH model was introduced by Ding et al. (1993) and gained currency fast in the 
finance literature.3 Let growth (yt) follow a white noise process augmented by a “risk 
premium” defined in terms of volatility 
 
       ( 1 )  
with 
 
 
where ht denotes the conditional variance of growth, xit is the political instability variable 
(where  i denotes assassinations, strikes, constitutional or legislative changes) and the 
symbol ‘≡’ indicates equality by definition. In addition, {et} are independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d) random variables with E(et) = E(et2-1) = 0, while h t is positive with 
probability one and is a measurable function of the sigma-algebra ∑t-1, which is generated 
by {yt-1, yt-2,…}.  
Moreover, ht is specified as an asymmetric PARCH(1,1) process with lagged growth 
included in the variance equation 
 
    (2) 
with 
 
 
where  δ (with δ>0) is the “heteroscedasticity parameter,” α and β are the ARCH and 
GARCH coefficients respectively, ς with ׀ς׀ < 1 is the “leverage” term and γl is the “level” 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Karanasos and Kim (2006). Karanasos and Schurer, (2005) use this process to model output 
growth in Italy.   3
term for the lth lag of growth.4 In order to distinguish the general PARCH model from a 
version in which δ is fixed we refer to the latter as (P)ARCH. 
The PARCH model increases the flexibility of the conditional variance specification 
by allowing the data to determine the power of growth for which the predictable structure in 
the volatility pattern is the strongest. This feature in the volatility process has important 
implications for the relationship between political instability, growth and its volatility. 
There is no strong reason for assuming that the conditional variance is a linear function of 
lagged squared errors. The common use of a squared term in this role is most likely to be a 
reflection of the normality assumption traditionally invoked. However, if we accept that 
growth data are very likely to have a non-normal error distribution, then the superiority of 
a squared term is unwarranted and other power transformations may be more appropriate. 
 
3. Data 
Our data are from the Cross National Time Series Data set (Banks 2005) which contains 
historical series on income per capita and various dimensions of political instability.5 Data 
are available yearly for Argentina from 1896 until 2000, excluding the World War years. 
Income per capita is in constant U.S. dollars. 
We use two measures of “formal” political instability: the number of legislative 
elections (defined as number of elections for the lower house each year) and the number of 
constitutional changes. The latter “reflects the number of basic alterations in a state's 
constitutional structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that 
                                                 
4  The model imposes a Box-Cox power transformation of the conditional standard deviation process and the 
asymmetric absolute residuals. 
5  Banks is a commercial dataset that has been used extensively in the scholarship on growth and political 
instability (Durlauf et al. 2005).     4
significantly alters the prerogatives of the various branches of government.” These series 
are available since 1896. 
We use two measures of “informal” political instability. Assassinations are defined as 
“any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or 
politician,” while general strikes are defined “as any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or 
service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 
government policies or authority.” The variable assassinations reaches its maximum in 
1974 (16 assassinations registered) with second and third highest values (12 and 10) 
registered in the immediately subsequent years. Notice that general strikes does not cover 
sector-specific strikes. This peaks in 1969 (13 general strikes registered) with the second 
highest count registered in the subsequent year (7 strikes).  These series are available since 
1919. 
The political instability measure with the largest average (standard deviations in 
parenthesis) is general strikes with 1.1 per year (0.2), followed by assassinations with 0.8 
(0.3), legislative elections with 0.4 (.05) and constitutional changes with 0.08 (0.02).  
 
4. Results 
We proceed with the estimation of the PARCH(1,1) model in equations (1) and (2) in order to 
take into account the serial correlation observed in the levels and power transformations of 
our time series data. Tables 1 and 2 report the estimated parameters of interest for the 
period 1896-2000. These were obtained by quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) as 
implemented in EVIEWS. The best fitting specification is chosen according to the Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) results and the minimum value of the Information Criteria (IC) (not reported).   5
Once heteroscedasticity in the conditional mean has been accounted for, our specifications 
appear to capture the serial correlation in the growth series.6 
In order to study the direct effects of political instability we specify model 1 with 
φ=γl=0, while model 2 (with λ=0) allow us to investigate their indirect effects. In most of the 
cases the estimates for the “in-mean” parameter (k) are statistically significant and positive. 
The estimated ARCH and GARCH parameters (α and β) are highly significant in almost all 
cases. For model 1 (φ=γl =0), when the “informal” political stability variables are used, the 
IC choose (P)ARCH model with power term parameter δ equal to 0.5 (the corresponding 
value for the “formal” political stability variables specification is 0.8.) For model 2 (λ=0), 
with the “formal” political instability variables Akaike IC (AIC) selects (P)ARCH models 
with δ equal to 1, while when strikes are used the chosen value of δ (0.5) is lower than that 
for the specification with the assassinations (0.8).7 
 
                                                 
6 For all cases, we find the leverage term to be insignificant and therefore we re-estimate the model excluding 
this parameter. 
7 In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in Table 2, various lags of growth (from 1 to 12) were 
considered with the best model (l = 6) chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC. For all cases, there 
is strong evidence that growth affects its uncertainty positively. Hence, there is a positive bidirectional feedback 
between growth and its volatility (note the existing empirical literature focuses almost exclusively on the effect 
of volatility on growth, see Fountas and Karanasos 2007). 
   6
From the results for Model 1 reported in Table 1, the parameters λ for assassinations 
and strikes (our measures of “informal” political instability) reveal their direct, negative 
impact on economic growth, while the equivalent effects for our “formal” political instability 
variables (constitutional and legislative changes) are not statistically significant. It is worth 
noting that the former impact disappears after six years (results not reported). On the other 
hand,  examining the results for Model 2 (reported in Table 2), and focusing our attention on 
the φ parameters we can see that our “formal” political instability variables have indirect 
(through volatility) negative effects on growth, while these effects from assassinations and 
strikes are statistically insignificant. Interestingly, we find evidence that such indirect 
effect becomes stronger after three years (results not reported).  
 
 
  
 
5. Conclusions 
Our main finding is that while “informal” political instability has a direct, negative effect on 
economic growth, “formal” political instability has mostly an indirect impact (through 
volatility). One main suggestion for future work is to investigate whether the effects of   7
“formal” political instability are stronger in the long run while those of “informal” political 
instability are stronger in the short run (an idea for which we find preliminary support, as 
noted above). 
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